The Danger of Pesticide Manufacturer Immunity:
A History of Corporate Deception and Regulatory Failure

Executive Summary

The pesticide industry has a documented history of deception and fraud designed to prioritize profit over public health and environmental safety. Companies like Bayer/Monsanto and ChemChina have systematically engaged in practices ranging from falsifying scientific research to suppressing critical safety data. They have even targeted individuals and organizations who raise concerns, working to discredit them and undermine legitimate scientific debate. This pattern of behavior reveals a blatant disregard for public health. If not for litigation against these companies, many of these fraudulent practices would remain hidden from public view.

Giving immunity to pesticide manufacturers for violations of federal labeling requirements would effectively eliminate accountability and critically endanger public health.

Prior examples of glyphosate, paraquat, dicamba, and chlorpyrifos reveal that pesticide manufacturers cannot be trusted to honestly disclose risks or comply with safety requirements. EPA regulates over 16,000 products and more are being developed every year. Litigation has been essential in uncovering internal documents that expose corporate deception when EPA is incapable of doing so. **Granting immunity to pesticide manufacturers for violations of federal labeling requirements would reward corporate deception, remove a critical check on misconduct, and leave the public with no remedy when harmed by products whose risks were deliberately concealed.**

Rather than immunizing corporations from the consequences of their actions, policymakers should strengthen regulatory oversight, enhance penalties for violations, and preserve the public's right to hold companies accountable when harmed by unlawfully labeled pesticides.

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FIFRA: A Regulatory Framework Favoring Industry

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) has fundamental flaws that place undue trust in pesticide manufacturers. The current regulatory system is inherently compromised by its reliance on manufacturers to generate and interpret their own safety data.

FIFRA **"places primary responsibility for generating and submitting critical safety data on pesticide manufacturers themselves,"** making the EPA's role predominantly reactive. In effect, manufacturers control the scope and design of key studies, while EPA staff, limited by time and resources, largely rely on industry's submissions. This structure allows selective data reporting, underestimation of real-world hazards, and delays in identifying harmful effects.

Under **7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)**, manufacturers (registrants) must provide the core data for any pesticide seeking registration. While **7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)** places the onus on the registrant to supply "all reasonably required" studies, **the manufacturer decides** how to design and interpret what is reasonably required in the first instance.

FIFRA creates a system whereby the manufacturer:

- Provides the data
- Drafts initial labels
- Leads investigations of adverse events

While the EPA can ask for additional tests, the framework puts the EPA in a largely reactive position, making it highly dependent on information the pesticide companies choose to provide.

Importantly, 40 C.F.R. Part 158 focuses testing requirements primarily on active ingredients, with much less scrutiny on inert ingredients or formulated products. This creates a significant gap in safety assessment, as commercial products often have dramatically different toxicity profiles than their active ingredients alone. This has been most prominent in understanding the risks of Roundup.

Glyphosate/Roundup: Systematic Deception by Monsanto

Roundup vs. Glyphosate: A Critical Distinction
Monsanto's lead toxicologist and glyphosate spokesperson, Donna Farmer, has repeatedly stressed: "The terms glyphosate and Roundup cannot be used interchangeably, nor can you use 'Roundup' for all glyphosate-based herbicides anymore." This distinction is critical because Roundup contains far more than just glyphosate.

The formulated product Roundup also contains surfactants (such as POEA, which is banned in Europe) and other contaminants/impurities (such as formaldehyde). Studies have shown that the formulated product Roundup is significantly more toxic than glyphosate alone. Recent research estimates that glyphosate formulations are **50-fold more toxic to human cells** than pure glyphosate.

Despite this crucial distinction, the U.S. EPA does not require any long-term carcinogenicity tests on formulated products, only on active ingredients. This creates a fundamental gap in safety assessment. This gap has been repeatedly exploited by Monsanto and Bayer.

Fraudulent Initial Registration
Monsanto's initial registration of glyphosate in 1974 was based on fraudulent testing conducted by Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories (IBT). The circumstances suggest deliberate manipulation:

1. In March 1971, Paul Wright, a Monsanto employee, left Monsanto and went to work for IBT.
2. Testing on glyphosate occurred from March 1971 to October 1972 — all while Paul Wright was at IBT.
3. In October 1972, Paul Wright left IBT and returned to Monsanto.
4. IBT executives, including Paul Wright, were later prosecuted and convicted for fraudulent testing while at IBT.

EPA documents show that Monsanto **"knew about the IBT fraud before submitting information to the EPA for Roundup's initial registration."** One document explicitly noted a **"Strong indication of client's knowledge of the deficiencies before they issued their report."**

Only **two** long-term carcinogenicity tests — one in mice and one in rats — were required to register glyphosate under FIFRA. Those tests, conducted by IBT, were sent to EPA in 1973, and glyphosate was registered in 1974 based on these fraudulent tests.

In 1978, EPA invalidated various IBT studies and required Monsanto to repeat its studies. Yet Monsanto did not complete the redone mouse study until 1983 — **five years** after EPA ordered it. This means from

1974 to 1983, Monsanto sold Roundup without telling consumers that its registration was based upon invalidated testing.

The "Magic Tumor" and Manipulation of EPA's Cancer Classification
In 1985, EPA reviewed the results of the redone mouse study (Knezevich & Hogan, 1983) and proposed classifying glyphosate as a "Category C oncogen" (possible human carcinogen). This classification would have had devastating financial consequences for Monsanto, including:

1. Potential registration cancellation
2. Loss of use on food crops under the "Delaney Clause"
3. Classification of Roundup as a "restricted use pesticide," limiting sales to licensed applicators and removing it from the general consumer market

The timing was particularly concerning for Monsanto as Roundup sales were soaring in 1985.
In February 1985, Monsanto met with EPA to prevent this classification from becoming official. Monsanto's own meeting minutes reveal their explicit goal: to do whatever necessary to prevent EPA regulators from classifying glyphosate as a Class C oncogene. According to these minutes, Monsanto aimed to **"respond to [EPA] concerns before any unnecessary comments became a part of the Roundup permanent file."**

At this meeting, Monsanto employee Fred Johanssen asked the revealing question: **"Short of a new study or finding tumors in the control groups, what can we do to get this thing off of group 'c'?"** This question explicitly suggested that finding tumors in the control group would invalidate the statistical significance of the findings.

Monsanto immediately hired Dr. Marvin Kuschner to review the kidney slides from the mouse study. An internal Monsanto memo from **April 1985** made the purpose clear: Dr. Kuschner was hired to "review kidney sections and present his evaluation of them to EPA **in an effort to persuade the agency that the observed tumors are not related to glyphosate."**

Just as Johanssen had suggested, Dr. Kuschner "discovered a tumor in a control mouse which had not been previously reported." Monsanto promptly wrote to EPA with these "findings" in **May 1985**. This "magic tumor" discovery in the control group conveniently meant that the results of the mouse study were no longer statistically significant.

After months of debate, EPA issued a Reregistration Guidance **requiring** Monsanto to repeat the mouse study, noting that "The apparent lesion in the control kidney was **not present** in any of the additional sections…the Agency is requiring that this study be repeated[.]" **Monsanto never conducted this second repeat mouse study** that EPA required. According to an email from Mark Martens, Monsanto's toxicology director, the reason was fear: "if somebody came to me and said they wanted to test Roundup I know how I would react -- with serious concern."

EPA was about to list glyphosate as a carcinogen in 1985 until this manipulation. The manipulation of this 1983 mouse study represents one of the clearest examples of Monsanto's direct interference with the regulatory process to prevent a cancer classification, all in an effort to put profits over people.

Fighting Against Safety Provisions

In 1986, the EPA required Monsanto to add several worker-safety provisions to Roundup product labels, such as wearing gloves and chemical-resistant shoes. Monsanto strongly resisted these requirements, not because of safety concerns, but because of potential market disadvantage.

In its "Request for postponement of additional requirements for protective clothing for glyphosate products," Monsanto stated: "if we implement the Agency requested Label statements at this time, we find that the timing of adding these label amendment requirements **will put us at a serious competitive disadvantage in the marketplace.**"

Suppression of Genotoxicity Evidence

In 1999, Monsanto hired Dr. James Parry, a world-renowned toxicologist, to review recent genotoxicity studies and make recommendations to counter mounting evidence that glyphosate is genotoxic and causes oxidative stress.

1. Dr. Parry's initial report concluded that **"the overall data provided by the four publications provide evidence to support a model that Glyphosate is capable of producing genotoxicity both *in vivo* and *in vitro* by a mechanism based upon the production of oxidative damage."**
2. After receiving this unfavorable report, Monsanto had Dr. Parry sign a "secrecy agreement" before sending him additional materials to hopefully "turn his opinion around."
3. Dr. Parry's second report suggested that **"if the genotoxic activity of glyphosate and its formulations is confirmed it would be advisable to determine whether there are exposed individuals and groups within the human population"** and that those individuals should have their "lymphocytes analyzed for the presence of chromosome aberrations."
4. Bill Heydens candidly revealed Monsanto's strategy in an email: **"Let's take a step back and look at what we are really trying to achieve here. We want to find/develop someone who is comfortable with the genotox profile of glyphosate/Roundup and who can be influential with regulators and Scientific Outreach operations when genotox issues arise. My read is that Parry is not currently such a person, and it would take quite some time and $$$/studies to get him there."**
5. Heydens was explicit: **"We simply aren't going to do the studies Parry suggests…We have not made much progress and are currently very vulnerable in this area."**
6. In an admission during litigation, Monsanto confirmed that it never submitted Dr. Parry's reports to the EPA, despite being required to do so under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2).

Ghostwriting Scientific Literature

When Monsanto's plan with Dr. Parry failed, it instead moved forward with ghostwriting scientific articles to influence the literature on glyphosate safety:

1. In 1999, Dr. Gary Williams published "Safety Evaluation and Risk Assessment of the Herbicide Roundup and Its Active Ingredient, Glyphosate, for Humans," which found no genotoxicity in glyphosate or Roundup. However, internal Monsanto emails reveal that Monsanto employees were thanked "for their hardwork over three years of data collection, **writing, review**, and relationship building with the papers' authors."
2. In 2015, Heydens proposed that for another paper, Monsanto could "ghostwrite the Exposure Tox & Genotox sections," stating, **"Recall that is how we handled Williams Kroes & Munro, 2000."**
3. In his 2015 Year End Review, Monsanto's David Saltmiras bragged that he "Ghost authored…key and time critical glyphosate safety publications." Tellingly, this was listed under a subheading "IARC, Regulatory/FTO and Moms Across America Publications." In other words, the ghostwriting was explicitly aimed at influencing regulators and protecting Monsanto's "freedom to operate."

Internal emails reveal that Monsanto routinely used ghostwritten papers "in the defense of Roundup and Roundup Ready crops worldwide" and "for continued Roundup FTO [freedom to operate]."

Dermal Absorption Testing Cover-Up

In 2001, Monsanto hired TNO Labs to conduct rat skin and human skin dermal penetration studies for several Roundup formulations. The purpose was to support regulatory registrations in Europe. When the results showed higher skin absorption rates than Monsanto's historical 3% figure, the company took drastic action:

1. Monsanto lead Bill Heydens expressed concern that these results would **"blow Roundup risk evaluations"** by showing a much higher dermal penetration rate than previously claimed.
2. When results continued to be unfavorable, Monsanto shut down the study: **"We decided thus to STOP the study (effective today morning)."**
3. Richard Garnett explained to Donna Farmer that the studies were dropped **"for glyphosate because a further study was not likely to help us meet the project objective."**
4. Rather than submitting these unfavorable results to regulators as required under FIFRA Section 6(a)(2), Monsanto's Heydens and Farmer agreed that Monsanto **"should not finalize a report"** and **"the appropriate notes to file should be made…and the data archived."**

This skin penetration study indicated that formulated Roundup **could be absorbed through skin at rates up to 14%**, far higher than the 3% figure Monsanto claimed to regulators. To this day, EPA has not taken this fact into consideration when evaluating the risks of Roundup.

The Science of Glyphosate and Cancer

Recent independent research has provided substantial evidence of glyphosate and Roundup's carcinogenic potential:

1. **Mechanical studies** show that glyphosate and Roundup can:
    - Break DNA strands (Kwiatkowska et al., 2017)
    - Cause chromosomes to break or change structure (Santovito et al., 2018)
    - Create abnormal changes in gene control (He et al., 2022)
    - Generate harmful reactive oxygen molecules that damage cells (Liu et al., 2023)

2. **Formulated product toxicity** research shows:
    - Roundup was up to 50 times more toxic to human cells than pure glyphosate (Wozniak et al., 2018)
    - Roundup caused DNA damage at much lower concentrations (Wozniak et al., 2018)
    - Additional chemicals in Roundup made it more likely to penetrate skin (Rana et al., 2023)
3. **Human studies** found:
    - Farmers and applicators showed increased oxidative stress biomarkers (Sidthilaw et al., 2022)
    - Agricultural Health Study participants demonstrated association between glyphosate exposure and elevated oxidative stress biomarkers (Chang et al., 2023)
    - Children exposed to glyphosate showed oxidative stress markers and evidence of dermal absorption (Makris et al., 2020)

A comprehensive 2023 review of genotoxicity studies published since 2016 found:

- Of 94 new studies, 82 (87%) found glyphosate can damage DNA
- For pure glyphosate alone, 73% of studies showed harmful effects
- For commercial herbicide products, 95% of studies showed damage
- **100% of studies looking at exposed humans (7 of 7) found DNA damage**

EPA vs. IARC: Why Different Conclusions?

In 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified glyphosate as a "probable human carcinogen," while the EPA maintained that glyphosate was not likely to be carcinogenic. A study by Benbrook et al. (2019) identified key differences in their approaches:

1. **Different study selection:**
    - EPA relied heavily on 52 Monsanto-conducted genotoxicity assays, of which only 2% showed signs of genotoxicity
    - EPA also analyzed 52 published studies, of which 67% indicated potential harm, but discounted most of these findings
    - IARC examined 118 genotoxicity assays and included 81 additional studies that EPA ignored
    - 77% of these additional studies indicated positive genotoxic effects
2. **Focus on real-world exposure:**
    - IARC considered commercial formulations that people actually use
    - 75% of studies on formulated products showed adverse effects
    - EPA largely focused on pure glyphosate alone and dismissed studies on formulated products
3. **Occupational hazards:**
    - IARC considered high-exposure scenarios like leaking equipment, wind drift, and spills
    - EPA concentrated primarily on residual dietary exposure
4. **Evidence weighting:**
    - EPA prioritized industry-generated data and discounted independent research
    - IARC emphasized peer-reviewed studies and real-world exposure scenarios

The EPA's conclusions were ultimately thrown out by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2022, which found that the EPA's risk assessment for glyphosate was "arbitrary and capricious." The Court ruled that EPA failed to follow its own cancer guidelines and inappropriately excluded relevant studies.

Misleading Advertising and Safety Claims

Monsanto has consistently misrepresented Roundup's safety to the public:

1. Promotional materials included graphics showing that glyphosate is purportedly safer than table salt and chocolate, despite internal recognition that such comparisons violated FIFRA Sec. 156.10(a)(5), which prohibits "comparative statements on the safety of the product."
2. Monsanto representatives often claimed glyphosate was "safe enough to drink." Donna Farmer noted that "some of our employees would drink a little glyphosate/Roundup to 'prove' how safe it was."
3. Safety Data Sheets stated that "if absorbed through the skin, [Roundup] is considered practically non-toxic to internal organs," despite the TNO study showing significant dermal absorption.
4. Monsanto has been sued by the state of New York twice for making false and misleading representations about Roundup. The first lawsuit resolved in 1996 with an Assurance of Discontinuance, but Monsanto continued its misleading advertising elsewhere and eventually in New York again, leading to another lawsuit in 2023.
5. Television commercials showed dogs pouring Roundup and called it "the first biodegradable herbicide," and depicted consumers spraying Roundup in shorts with no protective equipment.

Paraquat: Concealing Neurological Risks

Fraudulent Initial Testing

Like glyphosate, paraquat's original registration and approval was obtained through fraudulent studies conducted by Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories:

1. In 1963, scientists noticed "unusually high" mortality rates in IBT's chronic paraquat study in mice. IBT's founder responded by assuring the manufacturer he would place additional mice in the study to meet regulator requirements.
2. By 1966, scientists were aware that IBT's reports contained "exceedingly serious" errors from a "scientific point of view."
3. By 1976, internal documents acknowledged that the original IBT tests "would not withstand critical scrutiny."

Despite these known deficiencies, the fraudulent data was used to secure regulatory approval.

Deliberate Avoidance of Brain Testing

ChemChina's subsidiary Syngenta recognized paraquat's neurotoxicity in the early 1960s but deliberately designed studies to avoid investigating the extent of risk:

1. Syngenta Principal Science Advisor Phil Botham admitted in a deposition that Syngenta intentionally didn't conduct studies to determine how much paraquat was getting into animal brains since the detection of any paraquat in the brain would "not be perceived externally in a positive light."

2. Botham further admitted, "No matter what the route of exposure, paraquat will get into the brain" and "Once paraquat is in the brain, it stays in there 'a long time.'"
3. Syngenta knew that workers using paraquat as directed by the label would get paraquat in their brains as early as the mid-1990s. A 1980 study confirmed that workers regularly come into contact with paraquat on their hands and through their nose, yet this information was never submitted to the EPA.
4. Despite recognizing paraquat's neurotoxicity in the early 1960s, Syngenta chose not to conduct studies on humans or non-human primates to investigate the effects of chronic exposure for nearly 50 years.

Suppressing Squirrel Monkey Studies

Syngenta concealed critical studies showing paraquat's neurotoxic effects:

1. Squirrel monkey studies showed paraquat entered and accumulated in the brain and caused changes directly tied to Parkinson's disease.
2. The scientist who conducted the study worked for Syngenta and never published the information.
3. Syngenta did not turn over this information to the EPA.
4. Instead, they commissioned a separate study that deliberately avoided examining brain accumulation.

Manipulating EPA's Science Advisory Panel

Syngenta secretly worked to influence the composition of the EPA's Science Advisory Panel:

1. Syngenta employees secretly used an agricultural trade association (CropLife America) to send information to the EPA against the nomination of a scientist known for establishing strong evidence that paraquat could cause Parkinson's disease.
2. The company wanted to "ensure these efforts could not be traced back to them."
3. In defeating the scientist's nomination to the SAP, Syngenta removed a "potential threat" to the continued sale of paraquat.

Moreover, Syngenta deceptively designed mouse studies to undermine evidence of paraquat's neurological effects:

1. The company had its scientists manually count neuron loss, which produced "not statistically significant" results. This finding was publicized, and the scientist was nominated for an award.
2. When the same scientist later used a more accurate, automated counting technique, they found that paraquat did result in statistically significant loss of relevant brain cells, consistent with independent studies Syngenta intended to discredit. Critically, Syngenta did not publicize this result.

Dicamba: Strategic Omissions and Industry Pressure

Dicamba presents another case of a pesticide manufacturer concealing important safety information:

1. Internal company memos revealed during litigation show Monsanto decided to halt all testing of "low-volatility" dicamba after an incident suggested it might still volatilize. This kept a "clean slate" for the product when they applied for a label.

2. When the EPA approved the product for over-the-top spraying in 2017 based on tests conducted in artificially controlled conditions, the product easily volatilized and decimated 3.6 million acres of soybeans and caused widespread tree death across the South and Midwest.
3. In 2018, EPA leadership directed career staff to rely on a limited data set, discount specific studies with more robust data, and discount scientific information on negative impacts when approving an "updated" dicamba label.
4. Seeds engineered to be dicamba-resistant were introduced prior to risk evaluations of the companion herbicide's broader profile for over-the-top spraying. This put pressure on the EPA to conditionally approve a "low-volatility" dicamba to prevent farmers from using older formulations.

Chlorpyrifos: Persistently Prioritizing Profits Despite Known Harm

The case of chlorpyrifos highlights how pesticide manufacturers fight to maintain registrations even when severe health risks are documented:

1. In 2016, the EPA found no safe uses of chlorpyrifos existed due to irreversible neurological damage in children exposed to trace amounts, causing autism and ADHD.
2. Nevertheless, the agency proposed allowing restricted use on 11 crops in 2020 to preserve agricultural benefits.
3. Courts intervened repeatedly: the Ninth Circuit forced a 2021 ban after deeming the EPA's delays unacceptable, but the Eighth Circuit later reversed this in 2023, ordering the EPA to reconsider partial allowances.
4. By 2024, the EPA allowed limited uses of the pesticide, demonstrating that even when severe adverse risks are acknowledged by the agency, the EPA will continue to allow pesticide use under a cost-benefit analysis.

Patterns of Corporate Misconduct

The examples above reveal consistent patterns of misconduct by pesticide manufacturers:

Falsifying Authorship

- Monsanto scientists ghostwrote research papers and then had independent experts "edit & sign their names so to speak."
- This was particularly evident in studies on Roundup's toxicity and genotoxicity, such as Williams, Kroes & Munro (2000) and Kier & Kirkland (2013).
- These practices created an appearance of "independent" scientific assessment while the actual content was controlled by Monsanto.

Falsifying Data

- Both glyphosate and paraquat were initially registered based on fraudulent studies conducted by IBT Labs.
- In the case of glyphosate, Monsanto sent an employee to IBT to oversee the testing and later paid for his legal defense when he was criminally convicted.
- In paraquat studies, IBT's founder assured the manufacturer he would manipulate the study by adding additional mice to meet regulatory requirements despite "unusually high" mortality rates.

Failing to Generate Required Data

- When Dr. Parry suggested additional studies on glyphosate's genotoxicity, Monsanto explicitly decided, "We simply aren't going to do the studies Parry suggests."
- Syngenta deliberately avoided testing how much paraquat entered the brain, knowing it would yield unfavorable results.
- Monsanto halted testing of "low-volatility" dicamba when results suggested it might still volatilize.

Suppressing Evidence

- Syngenta designed mouse studies to find dopamine loss was "not statistically significant" by having scientists manually count neuron loss, while hiding automated counting results that showed significant damage.
- Monsanto terminated the TNO dermal penetration studies when results showed higher-than-expected skin absorption of glyphosate.
- Multiple companies buried the results of unfavorable internal research and publicly touted only studies that favored their position.

Unduly Influencing Review Processes

- Monsanto met with EPA in 1985 to prevent glyphosate from being classified as a Class C oncogene.
- Monsanto hired Dr. Marvin Kuschner specifically to "find" tumors in the control group of mouse studies to manipulate statistical significance and undermine EPA's cancer classification.
- Syngenta secretly used an agricultural trade association to block the appointment of a scientist to the EPA's Science Advisory Panel who had found evidence linking paraquat to Parkinson's disease.

Failing to Disclose Required Information

- Monsanto never submitted Dr. Parry's reports on glyphosate's genotoxicity to the EPA, despite FIFRA requirements.
- Monsanto did not report the TNO dermal penetration study results to regulators.
- Syngenta didn't disclose to the EPA that paraquat entered and accumulated in the brain and could cause Parkinson's disease.

Collusion with Government Agencies

- Internal emails show that EPA worked closely with Monsanto to "sustain our conclusions" about glyphosate safety.
- An EPA employee shut down an independent review of glyphosate's carcinogenicity by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, with Monsanto executives noting he should "get a medal" for this action.

Discrediting Critics

- Bayer/Monsanto attacked scientists who published studies questioning glyphosate's safety.

- Monsanto orchestrated a campaign to destroy the International Agency for Research on Cancer after its critical evaluation of glyphosate.
- When Gilles-Éric Séralini published a study showing rats fed glyphosate developed tumors, Monsanto engaged a network of scientists to attack the paper, with one article even being ghostwritten by Monsanto.

Creating Misleading Scientific Consensus

- Monsanto flooded EPA with 51 bacterial reverse mutation assays (despite EPA only requiring one such test) because they consistently showed negative results.
- Companies selectively published favorable studies while suppressing unfavorable results, creating a distorted picture in the scientific literature.
- Ghostwritten papers were strategically placed to create an appearance of scientific consensus that didn't actually exist.

Why Immunity Would Endanger Public Health

Granting pesticide manufacturers immunity from liability for violations of federal labeling requirements would effectively remove one of the few meaningful checks on corporate misconduct in the pesticide industry. The documented patterns above demonstrate that:

1. **The regulatory system is inherently compromised** by its dependence on manufacturer-generated data and interpretations.
2. **FIFRA's mechanisms are inadequate** to protect public health when manufacturers deliberately conceal, falsify, or manipulate safety information.
3. **EPA lacks resources and authority** to independently verify all manufacturer claims or to proactively identify risks.
4. **Litigation has been crucial** in exposing internal documents that reveal corporate knowledge of risks and deliberate efforts to mislead regulators and the public.
5. **The threat of liability** is one of the few incentives companies have to be honest about their products' risks and to comply with labeling requirements.
6. **Without the discovery process in litigation**, many of the examples of misconduct documented in this report would never have come to light.
7. **Immunity would remove accountability** for even the most egregious and deliberate violations, such as knowingly concealing evidence of carcinogenicity or neurotoxicity.
8. **The cost of immunity** would be borne by farmers, agricultural workers, consumers, and communities exposed to inadequately labeled pesticides.

Conclusion

The pesticide industry has demonstrated a persistent pattern of concealing risks, manipulating science, and misleading regulators to maintain product registrations and maximize profits. These actions have directly endangered public health and the environment. The examples of glyphosate, paraquat, dicamba, and chlorpyrifos reveal that manufacturers cannot be trusted to honestly disclose risks or comply with safety requirements without the threat of legal accountability.

Litigation has been essential in uncovering internal documents that expose corporate misconduct and in providing recourse for those harmed by pesticides. Granting immunity to pesticide manufacturers for violations of federal labeling requirements would reward corporate deception, remove a critical check on misconduct, and leave the public with no remedy when harmed by products whose risks were deliberately concealed.

Rather than immunizing corporations from the consequences of their actions, policymakers should strengthen regulatory oversight, enhance penalties for violations, and preserve the public's right to seek redress when harmed by unlawfully labeled pesticides.